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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 920579-CA 
v. : Priority No. 10 
DEVON BOYD POTTER, t 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal from a trial court 
order suppressing evidence in a prosecution for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i)(B) (Supp. 1992), and possession of drug paraphernalia, 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37a-5 (1990), both class B misdemeanors, 
entered by the Seventh District Court, in and for Emery County, 
Utah, the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, presiding. This Court 
granted the State's interlocutory appeal petition by order dated 
October 7, 1992. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992), and Rule 26(3)(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court erroneously suppress evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant-supported search of defendant's 
home, based upon its ruling that no "exigent circumstances" 
justified a warrantless, pre-search entry to secure the premises? 
A trial court's "exigent circumstances" determination is reversed 
on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah App. 1991). The question of whether suppression is the 
remedy for an improper home entry, where the evidence was seized 
independently from the entry, is one of law, reviewed without 
deference to the trial court. See Seoura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 799, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3382 (1984). 
2. Did the trial court erroneously rule that the 
search warrant, pursuant to which contraband was found in 
defendant's home, failed the "particularity" requirement because 
of an apparent error in describing defendant's home address? 
This issue appears subject to nondeferential review for legal 
error, examining the warrant, and the facts known to the 
executing officers, to ascertain whether with reasonable effort, 
the correct premises could be found. See United States v. Burke, 
784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.) (reversing suppression order under 
"reasonable effort" analysis), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 
S. Ct. 2901 (1986). 
3. Did the trial court erroneously reject the State's 
argument that even if the search warrant was defective, the "good 
faith-reasonable reliance" exception to the exclusionary rule 
should apply? Once the underlying facts are established, the 
issue of whether the "good faith-reasonable reliance" exception 
might apply, permitting admission of evidence seized pursuant to 
a subsequently-invalidated warrant, is considered a question of 
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law. United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
The text of any other pertinent constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules will be contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant is charged with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, both class B misdemeanors (R. I).1 The evidence 
supporting the charges includes, among other things, apparent 
leaf marijuana and "roaches" from marijuana cigarettes, as well 
as a hemostat, a "roach clip," and triple beam scales (R. 9). 
These items were seized during a warrant-authorized search of 
defendant's trailer home (R. 8). 
Defendant moved to suppress the above evidence, arguing 
that the home search violated the fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution (R. 34). However, neither in his supporting 
Citations to the main record are designated "R." The 
evidentiary hearing of the motion to suppress is designated "T." 
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memoranda, nor in his oral argument of the suppression motion, 
did defendant request or articulate a more rigorous analysis 
under Article I, section 14, than under the fourth amendment (R. 
127-44, 163-71; T. 78-82). He thus limited this case to federal 
constitutional analysis. See State v. Brown, Utah Adv. Rep. 
/ No. 900148, slip op. at 4 n.l (Utah Nov. 30, 1992); State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268, 1272-73 & n.5 (Utah App. 1990).2 
Defendant alleged four specific deficiencies in the 
search of his home: (1) that no "exigent circumstances" 
justified officer entry into his home prior to issuance of the 
warrant; (2) that the warrant was not supported by probable 
cause; (3) that the warrant affidavit contained recklessly false 
statements; and (4) that the warrant did not satisfy the 
"particularity" requirement in its description of the premises 
(R. 129-30). The State responded to all of defendant's 
allegations (R. 150-59), and further argued that even if the 
search warrant was somehow deficient, suppression of the evidence 
should be avoided under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S. Ct. 3405 (1984), because the searching officers had reasonably 
relied upon the warrant (R. 159-61). 
The trial court's grant of the motion to suppress was 
based upon only two of defendant's four supporting allegations. 
2The only state constitution-based rule cited by defendant was 
the Utah Supreme Court's holding, in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 472 (Utah 1990), that the exclusionary rule applies to 
violations of Article I, section 14, just as it does to Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
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The court ruled, first, that "[e]xigent circumstances did not 
exist to justify the officer's [sic] warrantless entry of 
defendant's home." Second, the court ruled that "[t]he search 
warrant was defective in that it did not 'particularly' describe 
the place to be searched" (R. 172). The court did not address 
defendant's other allegations, nor did it address the State's 
"reasonable reliance" argument. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The findings of fact underpinning the trial court's 
suppression order (R. 172-74, copied at Appendix I of this brief) 
are rather sketchy. This fact recitation will track the trial 
court's findings, fleshing them out as needed from the transcript 
of the hearing on the motion to suppress. 
The Warrantless Home Entry 
At about 10:30 p.m. on a winter evening, an Emery 
County sheriff's deputy stopped Leon Sandstrom for driving under 
the influence, near defendant's Huntington, Utah trailer home (R. 
172; T. 4-5, 8-9, 22-23, 28, 66). As the deputy asked him out of 
the vehicle for field sobriety testing, the intoxicated Sandstrom 
volunteered information that several men were then smoking 
marijuana inside defendant's home (T. 9).3 
Sandstrom told the deputy that he had left defendant's 
home because of the marijuana smoking; the vehicle he was 
3The trial court's finding that Sandstrom reported "seven 
persons" smoking marijuana (R; 173) appears clearly erroneous: 
only "several" or "some" marijuana smokers were reported (T. 9, 12, 
43). This error also found its way into the search warrant 
affidavit (R. 13). 
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driving, Sandstrom said, belonged to a Jim Ward, who was then 
present in defendant's home (T. 9). Sandstrom asked the deputy 
if his information about the goings-on in defendant's trailer 
home would "help him" regarding his likely DUI charge (T. 10). 
The deputy contacted Tom Harrison, an Emery County 
narcotics detective (T. 10-12, 41). Harrison came to the scene 
of the stop and spoke with Sandstrom, who repeated his account of 
marijuana smoking in defendant's trailer home, and claimed that 
the smokers possessed a baggie containing "about three fingers" 
of the aromatic weed (T. 42-43). 
By this time several other law officers had arrived at 
the scene, where Sandstrom's arrest, and the impoundment of the 
vehicle driven by Sandstrom, were in progress (T. 11, 43). 
Detective Harrison directed the officers to watch defendant's 
home while he applied for a warrant to search it (T. 24-25, 43-
44). While watching, and during the roughly forty-five minutes 
used to complete Sandstrom's arrest and the vehicle impoundment, 
the officers saw persons within defendant's home peering out 
through its window and door several times (R. 173; T. 11, 13, 
22). A car also drove to the home, and then left, during this 
interval (T. 18, 32-33)/ 
*That car, driven by defendant's brother, Wayne Potter, was 
stopped, and contraband recovered from it. Wayne Potter's 
prosecution was stymied by the trial court's suppression of that 
contraband, on the basis that the stop was improper. That 
suppression ruling is the subject of another State's appeal, State 
v. Wayne D. Potter, No. 920614-CA, also pending in this Court. 
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The watching officers reported their observations to 
Detective Harrison. In turn, Harrison, on advice from the county 
attorney who was helping him prepare the search warrant 
affidavit, directed the officers to enter defendant's home, and 
to secure it pending arrival of the search warrant (T. 13-17, 
32). The officers did so, and found defendant watching 
television with his brother Willie (also known as Brett, T. 56), 
and Jim Ward (T. 14, 66-68). There is no indication that 
criminal evidence was sought or seen at that time: the home was 
merely checked for other people, and secured (id.). 
The Warrant 
With the county attorney's help, Detective Harrison 
prepared a search warrant affidavit (warrant and affidavit at R. 
10-15, copied at Appendix II of this brief; T. 48-50). The 
affidavit recited Sandstrom's fresh report of marijuana smoking 
inside defendant's home (R. 13). Harrison also asked to search 
for proceeds and records of drug transactions (R. 12). These 
were sought because other narcotics officers had reported that 
defendant was a drug dealer (R. 14). Harrison also knew Jim 
Ward, the owner of the vehicle driven by Sandstrom, to be a drug 
abuser (id..; T. 59). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, 
Harrison explained that before seeking the warrant, he was 
already investigating defendant for narcotics offenses: 
informants had told Harrison that defendant was a marijuana 
dealer, and efforts to arrange a "controlled buy" from defendant 
were in progress (T. 44). 
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Harrison presented his affidavit to a magistrate at 
about 1:30 a.m. (R. 14; T. 50). The warrant was issued, 
authorizing the search of defendant's trailer home. On the 
warrantf as on the affidavit, the home was described as "50 West 
400 North, Black's Trailer Court, single wide trailer, second 
trailer headed West on 400 N. on So. side of road, belonging to 
DeVon Potter" (R. 10, 12, 173). The town, Huntington, was not 
named (R. 173). It was subsequently established that the actual 
street address of defendant's trailer was 7JL West 400 North; 
further, his trailer was the third one in the described sequence 
(R. 173; T. 52, 65). 
It was also revealed that at some point—apparently 
after defendant's home was secured but before the warrant was 
obtained, Detective Harrison had briefly returned to the area, 
and mistakenly knocked on the door of the wrong trailer home, 
neither described in the warrant affidavit nor under any 
investigation (T. 52-55). Harrison had apologized to the 
occupants of the mistakenly-approached home (T. 54-55, 58). 
Later, warrant in hand, Harrison and the other officers 
proceeded to search defendant's home (T. 56-58). Tlie contraband 
in question was seized, and this prosecution ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's finding that no exigent circumstances 
justified the pre-warrant entry of defendant's home was erroneous 
because it was induced by an incorrect view of the law. The 
court found insufficient evidence that the sought-after 
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contraband would be destroyed if officers did not enter the 
premises pending issuance of the search warrant. However, 
controlling authority, apparently disregarded by the trial court, 
holds that exigent circumstances exist when it appears only that 
contraband might be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained. 
Even if the trial court was correct, suppression of the evidence 
under its "no exigent circumstances" ruling is inappropriate, for 
the seized contraband was not the fruit of the entry, but of the 
subsequent, warrant-authorized search. 
The trial court's ruling that the search warrant did 
not satisfy the "particularity" requirement was erroneous because 
it was based on incomplete legal analysis. The court failed to 
examine the warrant to determine whether, notwithstanding a 
facial error in the address of the premises to be searched, 
officers executing the warrant could nevertheless find the 
correct premises with reasonable effort. Such examination is 
required under controlling law that accords with authority 
presented to the trial court. 
Finally, the trial court erroneously failed to analyze 
whether, even if the search warrant was somehow defective, the 
searching officers' reliance on it was reasonable. Such analysis 
is called for under federal authority that was briefed to the 
trial court. If satisfied, the reasonable reliance analysis 
permits evidence to be admitted even if some flaw in a search 
warrant is uncovered upon later review. The trial court erred in 
failing to perform that analysis here. 
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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND "NO EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES" JUSTIFYING THE PRE-WARRANT 
ENTRY OF DEFENDANT'S HOME; EVEN IF THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS CORRECT, THE EVIDENCE WAS SEIZED 
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE PRE-SEARCH ENTRY. 
A trial court's "exigent circumstances" determination 
is reversed on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 
1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991). Ashe was cited by the State in its 
memorandum opposing defendant's motion to suppress (R. 150-52). 
A. The Trial Court Overstated the Degree of Proof of 
"Exigent Circumstances." 
In rejecting the State's contention that "exigent 
circumstances" justified the pre-warrant entry and securing of 
defendant's home, the trial court ruled that "there was no reason 
to believe that the occupants of the home would destroy evidence 
before a search warrant could be obtained" (R. 173, emphasis 
added). The emphasized term, "would," overstates the degree of 
proof, set forth in Ashe, needed to show exigent circumstances. 
Because it applied an incorrect legal standard of proof to the 
question, the trial court's "no exigent circumstances" ruling was 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987) (quoting authority) (findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
when they are "induced by an erroneous view of the law"); State 
v. Svkes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 39 (Utah App. Oct. 19, 1992) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (appellate court must examine whether 
trial court applied the correct law in making its judgment). 
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In Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court comprehensively 
examined the "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant 
requirement. The court endorsed the exception for use in Utah 
under circumstances quite similar to this case—a warrantless 
entry into a home, where defendant, the home's occupant, had been 
apparently alerted to a narcotics investigation. So doing, the 
supreme court noted that "[n]umerous cases have sustained 
warrantless entries where the circumstances indicated that 
evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until 
a warrant could be obtained." 745 P.2d at 1258 & n.10 (citing 
cases) (emphasis added). 
The foregoing passage correctly sets a reasonable 
standard for finding exigent circumstances. Certainty that 
evidence would be lost pending issuance of a warrant is not 
required; only a justifiable belief that evidence might be lost 
is needed. Accord State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Utah 
App. 1988) ("One type of exigent circumstance . . . is when 
preservation of the evidence might be endangered by the delay in 
obtaining a warrant" (emphasis added), citing Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835-36 
(1966)). This is an entirely appropriate approach, for one 
hallmark of "exigency" is the existence of uncertainties: 
officers must occasionally act without prior judicial 
authorization, if only to stabilize a situation. This is 
precisely what occurred here. 
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Of course the officers could not know with certainty 
that defendant would destroy or remove evidence before the search 
warrant arrived. However, occupants of defendant's home were 
observed repeatedly peering outside, at the scene where Sandstrom 
was stopped (R. 173; T. 11, 13, 22). While this behavior was 
arguably consistent with innocent curiosity at the police 
presence in the neighborhood (cj[. defendant's memorandum at R. 
140-41), it was also consistent with a desire to keep tabs on the 
police while hiding or disposing of any incriminating evidence on 
the premises. 
The police, aware that their presence was being 
monitored, could not be reasonably certain that the evidence they 
hoped to recover would still be in defendant's home by the time 
the awaited search warrant arrived. As in Ashe, 745 P.2d at 
1260, such lack of certainty, arising through no fault of the 
involved officers, justified the warrantless entry of defendant's 
home. Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-65, 
91 S. Ct. 2022, 2036 (1971), and State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
470 (Utah 1990) (no exigency existed where searched vehicles had 
sat in same location for several days and there was no indication 
that removal was imminent). In fact, given that Sandstrom, when 
stopped, had reported marijuana use then in progress, the 
officers were justified in believing that the sought-after 
contraband might quite literally go up in smoke, if they waited 
to enter the home until the warrant arrived. 
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B. The Officers Properly Limited the Intrusiveness of 
the Pre-Search Entry. 
True enough, a warrantless home entry should not be 
lightly undertaken by police. Cf. Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1290 
(home entry is the "chief evil" restrained by the fourth 
amendment (quoting federal Supreme Court cases)). But here 
again, the record shows that the police did not enter defendant's 
home in disregard of this principle. They did no more than they 
were directed to do after reporting the apparent exigency to the 
supervising officer and the county attorney; that is, they 
entered and secured the premises. At that time, they neither 
observed nor seized any evidence, in "plain view" or otherwise. 
Compare State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543 (Utah 1979) (upholding 
warrantless home entry pursuant to arrest, and seizure of 
evidence in plain view). Instead, the officers waited until they 
obtained a warrant before undertaking the search that yielded the 
evidence in question. 
This was proper police conduct. The officers obeyed 
the constitutional imperative that a warrantless intrusion into a 
private area must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation." Mincev v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385, 
393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413 (1978) (home entry under exigent 
circumstances) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868, 1882 (1968)); accord State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825, 
827 (Utah App. 1988). Although not articulated to the trial 
court, this principle should be reaffirmed, to guide police in 
making on-the-spot decisions of the type that occurred here and, 
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equally important, to guide trial courts in the analysis of 
motions to suppress evidence. The limited-scope entry of 
defendant's home was proper, and affords no basis for suppression 
of the subsequently seized evidence• 
C. The Evidence Was Seized by Authority that Was 
Independent from the Pre-Warrant Entry, and Is 
Therefore Admissible, 
In basing the suppression order on its finding of "no 
exigent circumstances" to justify the initial home entry, the 
trial court seemingly accepted defendant's argument that the 
contraband seized pursuant to the subsequent, warrant-supported 
search was subject to suppression as "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" (defendant's rebuttal memorandum, at R. 137). Even if the 
trial court correctly found "no exigent circumstances," it 
committed legal error in accepting the "poisonous tree" argument. 
In Seaura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 
3380 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that evidence 
seized pursuant to a warrant was admissible, despite a pre-
warrant entry to the searched premises that was later found to be 
unsupported by exigent circumstances. So holding, the Court 
reaffirmed the "independent source doctrine": 
It has been well established for more than 60 
years that evidence is not to be excluded if 
the connection between the illegal police 
conduct and the discovery and seizure of the 
evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate 
the taint," . . . . It is not to be excluded, 
for example, if police had an "independent 
source" for discovery of the evidence. 
468 U.S. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at 3385 (citations omitted). The 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court have adopted the Seaura 
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independent source doctrine for fourth amendment suppression 
questions. See State v. Kellv, 718 P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1292-93 (Utah App. 1988). 
As applied to a pre-warrant home entry followed by a 
warrant-supported search, any Mtaint" from the pre-warrant entry 
is dissipated when probable cause to issue the warrant is 
supported by evidence separate and independent from that obtained 
upon the entry. Seaura, 468 U.S. at 799, 814, 104 S. Ct. at 
3382, 3390; Kellv. 718 P.2d at 392 ("the sources of the warrants 
were independently legal and unrelated to the impounding of the 
house"); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1293. This requirement was met 
here: the warrant affidavit set forth the facts known at the 
time Sandstrom was stopped outside defendant's home, plus 
Sandstrom's statements at that time (R. 12-14, Appendix II of 
this brief). Nothing learned upon the pre-warrant entry was used 
to support the search warrant for defendant's home.5 Therefore, 
under Sequra, Kellv, and Northrup, the evidence seized pursuant 
to the warrant-supported search of defendant's home is 
admissible, even if the pre-warrant entry was improper. 
5The pre-warrant entry did reveal evidence supporting the 
search of defendant's brother's home, authorized in the same 
warrant. An addendum to the warrant affidavit recited suspicious 
activity by Willie Potter, while he was removing his dog from 
defendant's home to his own nearby trailer home (R. 15, Appendix II 
of this brief). However, only the search of defendant's home, not 
Willie Potter's home, is at issue here. 
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POINT TWO 
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT VOID MERELY 
BECAUSE OF THE FACIAL "PARTICULARITY" ERROR 
IN ITS DESCRIPTION OF DEFENDANT'S HOME. 
The trial court also erred in suppressing evidence 
based upon its ruling that the search warrant, because of its 
erroneous description of defendant's home, violated the fourth 
amendment "particularity" requirement (R. 172). Opposing the 
motion to suppress, the State cited United States v. Burke, 784 
F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S. Ct. 
2901 (1986) (R. 159). That case held, "An erroneous description 
of premises to be searched does not render a warrant invalid." 
784 F.2d at 1092. The trial court did not address this authority 
in making its suppression ruling. 
The Burke holding comports with Utah law which, in 
turn, is consistent with federal Supreme Court law. See Steele 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 45 S. Ct. 414 (1925), followed in 
State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Mclntire, 768 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Utah App. 1989). Thus an 
erroneous description of the place to be searched does not 
automatically invalidate a warrant: "It is enough if the 
description is such that the officer with a search warrant can 
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place 
intended." Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1102 (quoting Steele, 267 U.S. 
at 503, 45 S. Ct. at 416, and adding emphasis). 
In undertaking the "reasonable effort" analysis, 
reviewing courts look to the facts known by the warrant-serving 
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officers, even if those facts are not recited in the warrant or 
supporting affidavit. Burke, 784 F.2d at 1092-93; cJE. Mclntire, 
768 P.2d at 972 (refusing to suppress evidence where premises 
were inaccurately described, where ,fthe record indicate[d]" the 
place officers intended to search). This approach properly 
"limits the search to the confines contemplated by the magistrate 
authorizing the warrant, while not invalidating searches because 
of minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's description." 
Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1103. 
It further appears that a ruling invalidating a warrant 
because of a "particularity" defect is reviewed nondeferentially 
on appeal, as a matter of law. Hence in Burke, the appellate 
court reversed a trial court order suppressing evidence under the 
above, "reasonable effort" analysis. 
The "reasonable effort" analysis is satisfied here, for 
despite the erroneous description of defendant's trailer home in 
the warrant, the officers knew, all along, the correct location 
of the home. The officers kept defendant's home under constant 
observation from the time Sandstrom volunteered the information 
that illegal activity was going on within, until the search 
actually occurred. The failure to list the town as Huntington is 
no more than a technical deficiency under Anderson, 701 P.2d at 
1099, for clearly, the officers were not about to abandon 
defendant's premises and seek out a similar address in another 
town. Additionally, the premises were described in the warrant 
as "belonging to DeVon Potter," i.e., defendant (R. 12). The 
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particularity problem in the warrant, then, could not invalidate 
it: reasonable officers would have, and in fact did, locate the 
correct premises. 
Nor does the fact that Detective Harrison at one point 
knocked on the door of the wrong home, one or two homes away from 
defendant's, invalidate the warrant. As Harrison's blunder, this 
had nothing to do with the validity of the warrant: "I don't 
know why I went to the wrong trailer," he testified (T. 58). 
Harrison's brief, apparently unreasonable mistake does not show 
that the warrant here failed the "reasonable effort" test for 
satisfaction of the particularity requirement. 
In sum, the trial court failed to properly analyze 
defendant's "particularity" challenge. The court ended its 
analysis prematurely upon finding a facial warrant defect, and 
therefore erroneously invalidated the warrant. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS 
THE STATE'S "REASONABLE RELIANCE" ARGUMENT IN 
OPPOSITION TO SUPPRESSION. 
Finally, the trial court erred in disregarding the 
State's argument that even if the search warrant were somehow 
defective, the officers reasonably relied upon it, such that the 
fruits of the search should not be suppressed. The State cited 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), in 
support of this argument (R. 160). 
The Leon decision makes the point that exclusion of 
relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is "an extreme 
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sanction." 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S. Ct. at 3417. While the 
sanction is appropriate "where a Fourth Amendment violation has 
been substantial and deliberate," 468 U.S. at 908-09, 104 S. Ct. 
at 3413, its application is of dubious value where law officer 
conduct is not deliberate. After all, in the area of substantive 
criminal law, punishment for a given harm will typically vary 
according to the "mens rea" under which the accused is found to 
have acted. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 through -206 (1990 
and Supp. 1992) (defining and punishing types of homicide 
according to accused's mental state). 
Leon thus recognizes that officer error that is not 
deliberate or extreme does not warrant the extreme sanction of 
excluding relevant evidence seized pursuant to the error. 
Further, consistent with the strong preference for warrants under 
prevailing fourth amendment law, the Leon opinion seeks to 
preserve the admissibility of evidence seized where law officers 
do not act on their own, but rather, seek and obtain advance 
judicial authorization, in the form of a warrant. "In most such 
cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter" 
by suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. 468 
U.S. at 920-21, 104 S. Ct. at 3419. Accordingly, where the 
officer "error" amounts to no more "objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant," 
suppression of evidence is not appropriate. 468 U.S. at 922, 104 
S. Ct. at 3420. 
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Application of the Leon "reasonable reliance" exception 
to suppression, once the underlying facts are established, is a 
question of law. United States v. Russell. 960 F.2d 421, 423 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied. U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 407 (1992). 
Here, given the limited ground upon which it invalidated this 
search warrant, the trial court erred in failing to consider 
Leon. The only ground for invalidating the warrant was the 
"particularity" problem in describing the premises to be 
searched—a ground that, as already shown, was erroneous. 
However, the searching officers, again as already shown, and 
quite reasonably, did not rely on the erroneous description of 
the premises. Their objectively reasonable nonreliance on the 
faulty portion of the warrant, under Leon, weighs decisively 
against suppression of the evidence. 
Even assuming, without deciding, that defendant has a 
plausible argument that the search warrant was unsupported by 
probable cause, Leon would weigh against suppression, for the 
officers reasonably relied on the warrant. After all, the 
existence of probable cause was a matter of disagreement between 
the attorneys involved in this case. The trial court, avoiding 
the issue, thereby suggested its own uncertainty on the 
question.6 Where these formally law-trained individuals could 
not agree on the probable cause question, the police, with less 
6The trial court, however, should have recognized its 
obligation to accord deference to the magistrate's probable cause 
determination, under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. 
Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983), cited to the court (T. 83-84). 
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training, cannot be faulted for relying upon the magistrate's 
probable cause determination, and issuance of the warrant. Once 
more, the officers did not search defendant's home until the 
neutral magistrate authorized them to do so: this police conduct 
should be upheld, not condemned. 
Accordingly, the trial court should have held that, 
despite possible error in the warrant, the officers conducted 
this search in objectively reasonable reliance on it. By failing 
to acknowledge Leon, the trial court erred in ordering 
suppression of the evidence seized from defendant's home. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to recognize and apply the 
appropriate legal tests in deciding defendant's motion to 
suppress. Its suppression order was therefore erroneous, and 
should be reversed. This case should be remanded to the trial 
court, with directions that the evidence seized pursuant to the 
search warrant be admitted against defendant at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this If day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHY VJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX I 
Trial Court Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
F I L E D 
AUG 1 3 1992 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O l A ^ u r^r, - v.em 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF~~UfSH L ^ ~ p^uty 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEVON BOYD POTTER, 
Defendant, 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 91-CR-2650 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on for Hearing on 
September 16, 1991. The Court heard the sworn testimony of the 
witnesses and then took the matter under advisement after re-
ceiving Memorandum from the parties. 
The Court finds that the evidence seized at the home of 
the defendant should be suppressed for the following reasons: 
A. Exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the 
officer's warrantless entry of defendant's home. 
B. The Search Warrant was defective in that it did not 
"particularly" describe the place to be searched. 
In arriving at this Ruling the court makes the following 
Findings: 
1. The informant Sandstrom was arrested near the defendant's 
home on February 15, 1991 at approximately 10:30 p.m. for a DUI,-
He was not stopped for any drug-related offense. 
-I >ir* 
-2-
2. Sandstrom, while intoxicated, volunteered a statement 
to the arresting officer that seven persons were smoking marijuana 
in defendant's house. 
3. Between the time of Sandstrom being stopped and the 
entry into defendant's home (possibly as long as 45 minutes), per-
sons peered out the window of defendant's home and were seen by the 
officer who arrested Sandstroom. 
4. No evidence was presented which would suggest the per-
sons in the defendant's home had reason to believe that Sandstrom, 
who was arrested for a traffic offense, would tell the officers 
that persons in the home were smoking marijuana. Accordingly, 
there was no reason to believe that the occupants of the home would 
destroy evidence before a search warrant could be obtained. 
5. The defendant's home is located at 75 West 400 North, 
Huntington, Utah, and the said home is the third house from the 
corner. 
6. The search warrant described the place to be searched 
as 50 West 400 North, Blacks Trailer Court, Single wide trailer, 
second trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road, 
belonging to Devon Potter. 
7. No house numbers were posted on the trailers. 
8. The search warrant did not state the city in which 
the house was located. 
9. The house to be searched could not have been ascer-
tained by reference to the Warrant itself because the Warrant did 
not describe the premises to be searched with particularity. 
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Fro the foregoing Findings the Court concludes that the 
evidence seized at the home of the defendant should be suppresses 
and denied admission into, evidence as trial. 
DATED this / day of August, 1992. 
<3-
^ 
DISTRICT COURT/JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of RULING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS to tfce parties addressed as 
follows, postage prepaid, this "l^-*n day of August, 1992: 
Patricia Geary 
Emery County Attorney 
P.O. Box 1099 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
Mart T. Ethington 
Attorney at Law 
45 E. Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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APPENDIX II 
Search Warrant Affidavit and Warrant 
IK THE J 
COUNTY OF EMERY. STATE OF UTAH 
COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Dei^T&Tfl&e 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant^). 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No 
OF UTAH ) 
f of Emery j 
ss. 
STATE I 
County i 
The affiant undersigned, being duly sworn, states on information and belief: 
Description The property for which a search warrant is sought is described as follows: 
of Property: 
Uaff. fMU&dt &m (JM 6*&; 
,MVS*/s<£ duL 
Grounds: .GTms unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
O Has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or conceal the 
commission of an offense. 
B i s evidence of illegal conduct, to wit: ffa*""* 
Location 
of Property: 
f^f 
I have probable cause to believe, and do believe, said properly b: 
ED^ n the person of &tff*Ai*t4 ^\ ^ pWttMM 
B In the vehicle described $$ 
M&jl 
( B i ) n the premises described n 
Possession 
fry Non-party 
nighttime 
Search: 
Information 
and Source: 
Reliablfty 
of Informant^ ): 
O Said property is in the possession of one who is not a party to the alleged illegal 
conduct, but 
O Cannot be obtained by subpoena because:. 
D If sought by subpoena, I believe the property would be concealed, destroyed, damaged 
or altered, because: 
D?i request that a nighttime search be authored. 
EK*believe that a nighttime search is necessary to seize the property prior to its 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered because {**&*£&<-{ 
ffi^Tha ve other good reason to authorize a nighttime search, towit: tL '"•/"'^•^fo? 
The information set forth in this affidavit was received by this officer from the (A) 
informint(s) named below, each of whom stated to this officer that he personalty 
perceived the (B) events described (unless otherwise indicated), on the (C) date 
shown, and who related the information to this officer on the (D) date shown. 
(A) Informant &erA SA^Jf^b^w^, 
(B) information A4 \\>.tt>f>lt\ *«fj/<pl Z~jh*A*J{,»vt *AffifiJfa feSZtlte pltf, fa 
AlLfdlA jtjjjt^ Lk^A^rt fkAAKt^M^jM. l*fL<4 tl*AP <*L*d*»t2«* YUAAJL** 
(C) Date Observed jf/f/ff 
(0) Oate Told To Affiant gj/f&j-
I believe the (A) informant(s) named above to be reliable for these reasons: 
(past experience, declaration against penal interest, citizen informant, etc.) 
If any informant is unnamed, t allege I have good reason to withhold his identity, to 
protect him and preserve his future usefulness. To reveal his identity would 
Verification: I have verified this information through my own investigation as follows- J»* U/AAffitA jtoourttA 
Perm vm ZnnCvCrf** 4M4J\AJP , %p <KfiifA*k /jJAtrito/Mu^ve** 
No Knock B i further request I be authorized to execute the search warrant without giving prior 
notice of my authority and purpose because: 
C f h e property sought b a narcotic or similar substance easily and quickly destroyed 
or disposed of. 
EHJanger to officer or another may result if notice is given. (Explain) LK&jfe&w 
Date gp»rf- /Q£-Si£-?y 
Time Signed: j2£l£L * " T ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ J ^ By: 
Affiant (Officer) 
This Affidavit was sworn to before me fiin person, O by telephone, by Affiant on the date and time shown. If by telephone;, 
the affidavit was prepared in duplicate originals, and signed for Affiant, who b known to me, at his request. 
'llCrc*-
< Magistrate 
ORDER 
GOOD CAUSE appearing, it b ordered that a search warrant be issued for the articles and places described in the 
affidavit, for an immediate search 
O in the daytime D upon notice 
Erfnytiffl*. <by or night BWrithout notice 
The affiant named above b further authorized by telephone by the magistrate undersigned to sign the name of the 
magistrate to said search warranto repared in accordance with the affidavit and order. 
Date: 2JL 
Time:, 
* N . SI fj„ s * < A 
Magistrate 
r Lf ; 
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
P.O. BOX 1099 
CASTLE DALE. UTAH 84513 
SCOTT N. J O H A N S E N , COUNTY ATTORNEY TELEPHONE: (801) 381*2543 
G E N E STRATE, DEPUTY 
JIM. . i p ^ ^ * ^ ^ ibJe*.* 
IN THE s W 7 2 r g COURT 
COUNTY Of EMERY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff. ) SEARCH WARRANT 
«i ) D Original 
T)tL\U. Qfo> > O Duplicate Origin.! 
Defendants) ) Criminal No 
COUNTY OF EMERY. STATE OF UTAH 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH J 
Proof by affidavit having been made before me this day by 
that there is probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and incorporated herein: 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make an immediate search, 
O in the daytime, 
EHtaytime, day or night, good cause having been shown by affidavit, * 
ItfoMhe person(s) of JMpeM*«A zX -jts, f \ \J+* ffflto AAIULAUP 
the vehicle(s) described i s 
FO'R THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY: ^ *w*/. 
>**4A&sk<9rijA 
A&C4rtJs ££w4 
and if you find the same or any part thereof, bring it forthwith before me at the 
Court and make return as required by Section 77-23-7 U.CA (1953) as amended. 
You C a r e O are not authorized to execute this warrant without giving prior notice of your authority and 
purpose. Make return within 10 days. 
Date: <^///<?/*)?, ,— yy > 
Time: / - N ^ f r f o ^ / j ? ^ BY:. 
Magistrate Officer 
O This warrant was signed by the officer named, for the magistrate at his telephoned request, both parties being 
known to each other, with the same force and effect as if signed personally by the magistrate. 
^ J t f s warrant was signed by the magistrate personally. 
